Good and Virtue (LS 60, 61)
Much of philosophy, its history has been consumed with the notion of good/bad/evil/vice etc. In other words it has been concerned with morality. As the Greeks identified the concept of virtue with the concept of goodness it further culminated in the idea that in order to be a good person one must know how to be good. Various philosophies and theologies all have their conceptions of the good, and for the most part—they are all pretty similar. Let’s just agree that generally the numerous guides on how to live match up. Where they diverge is in the conceptions of the genesis of those ideas, and some trivial particulars that can be labeled as amoral. Since most of morality is based on the idea of common sense, it is up to the various schools of philosophy (and religions) to explain why.
This is an appeal to our rational natures. It’s not simply enough that we are good or that we refrain from vice we have to know the important question, “why is it good?”
The Stoic answer is one of an appeal to nature. As rational beings we are compelled to act according to the nature. This is our innate tendency. We acquire this naturally,[1] as the mind arises out of the things accordance of nature (i.e. instinct, proper function) to reflect we arrive at the concept of the good.[2] This is intrinsic good, not comparative.[3] The good-in-itself, is that which is good in essence of the act itself. It is not good because of the consequences of the action.
This is the supreme good, this is that which draws the soul naturally toward itself.[4] In order to arrive at this good the rational mind is necessary. It is in this that we are further differentiated from the animals and plants. Without reflection one cannot find the natural inclination to be good. Animals, without this ability are therefore without the good. They are “indulgent,” living only in accordance with their natures based on the proper functions of the instinct.[5] While the animals can be perfect, their perfection is only in regard to their own nature.[6]
It is important to stress that good is based on knowledge. Knowledge, achieved through both observation and practice.[7] This applied goodness to action, the Stoic stress on moderation applies here. They have, according Seneca, grasped “moderation, courage, prudence, justice, and gave to each its due.[8]”
Further is that certain goods are those that are goods as a process, i.e. experiential goods such as joy, delight, modest socializing. Other goods are those that are goods in state, i.e. perdurant goods such as well organized leisure, undisturbed stability, and manly concentration.[9] These are goods as some generate happiness, others complete happiness, and certain goods do both.[10] While this concept may be objected that certain goods are going to be “more good” than others the Stoic belief is that all goods are equal and that consequently all vice are equal.[11]
These goods, instilled in a person and thus considered “virtue” are just one. The confusion of the perception of the different virtues is a matter of perspective not of essence. Virtue is likened to sight, in that “sight” is one sense, it is universal, but it perceives different colors and different objects.[12]
The virtuous man is wise and thus incapable of vice, he “does everything well is a consequence of his accomplishing everything in accordance with virtue, which is expertise with the whole of life.”[13] To go against virtue is to go against reason and thus we have the origin of vice.
Again, vice is unified, a person in vice is vicious no matter how much vice they involve themselves with, as Plutarch says, “just as in the sea a man an arm’s length from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk five hundred fathoms, so even those who are getting close to virtue are no less in a state of vice than those who are far from it.[14]”
Through repeated practice vice can be subsumed underneath the aegis of reason, and thus restrained. Vice is merely the superimposition of impulse over reason. Vice can never be removed completely from the individual[15] given the intertwining of impulse within the individual, nor ought it to be. In order to do so would be to remove the impulse from the person. The vice is intrinsic within the individual while the good ought to be superior.
[1] Diogenes Laertius 60C
[2] Cicero On Ends 60D
[3] ibid
[4] Epictetus Discourses 60F
[5] Seneca Letters 60H
[6] ibid
[7] Seneca Letters 60E
[8] Ibid—See also Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics for a different take on why these attributes are considered virtues.
[9] Stobaeus 60J
[10] Stobaeus 60M
[11] Diogenes Laertius 60O
[12] Plutarch On Moral Virtue 61B
[13] Stobaeus 61G
[14] Plutarch On Common Conceptions 61T
[15] Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions 61R
